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Abstract 
This article examines the U.S. Supreme Court’s lesser-known educative role as an 
egalitarian institution within a broader deliberative democratic process. Scholars 
have argued that the Court’s long asserted power of judicial review, especially in 
the equal protection and civil rights context, has been an over-reach of the judicial 
branch’s constitutional authority and responsibilities. Normative and empirical 
critiques have been centered on the aims of judicial review, and the challenges it 
poses in American political life. A core issue surrounding these critiques is that 
Justices are appointed not elected, and thus undermine the principle of majority 
rule in the U.S. constitutional democratic order. Although these critiques are legit-
imate in terms of claims about unelected Supreme Court Justices’ seemingly dis-
cretionary powers over elected legislative bodies, and the uncertain policy impli-
cations of judicial pronouncements on the broader society, there is, nevertheless, 
a positive application of judicial review as a tool Justices use as part of their edu-
cative role overcoming the so-called “counter-majoritarian difficulty.” Through 
a close reading of oral arguments in Brown vs. Board of Education (1954) and San 
Antonio vs. Rodriguez (1973)—two landmark cases invoking the Equal Protection 
Clause of the 14
th
 Amendment to the federal Constitution—the article shows how 
appointed Justices adjudicate individual cases on appeal and attempt to educate 
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(through an argumentative, reason-based and question-centered process) citizen-
litigants and their legal representatives about the importance of equality, fairness 
and ethical responsibility even prior to rendering final decisions on policy contro-
versies that have broader national social, political and economic implications. 
Keywords: educative court, deliberative democracy, judicial review, U.S. 
Supreme Court, ethical responsibility 
JEL Classification: K4, N42 
1. Introduction 
Since the landmark case of Marbury v. Madison (1803), U.S. scholars have argued 
over when and how to justify the power of judicial review under a written Consti-
tution that does not mention it (Rakove, 1990; Whittington, 2009). Alexander 
Bickel in 1968 warned that judicial review would lead to a “counter-majoritarian 
difficulty.” He meant that when unelected judges reviewed and declared unconsti-
tutional laws, policies or government actions by elected legislative bodies it would 
threaten the principle of majority rule at the heart of U.S. liberal democracy. Yet, 
Robert Dahl (1957) had already found an answer to this concern: 
To consider the Supreme Court of the United States strictly as a legal institution 
is to underestimate its significance in the American Political System. For it is al-
so a political institution, an institution, that is to say, for arriving at decisions on 
controversial questions of national policy. (p. 279) 
Dahl’s view has gained more wide support over the years (Voeten, 2014), 
while providing a more expansive understanding of the Court’s constitutional 
functions. So, the guiding question is not so much regarding judicial review, but 
rather whether or not the Court at times educates at the adjudicative level within 
its more recognized multi-constitutional roles. 
The question of whether the Court has an educative function has had scholarly 
interest since the mid-twentieth century (Epstein, Knight & Martin, 2001, pp. 583–
587). Eugene V. Rostow (1952) used the metaphor “a vital national seminar” to 
describe what the Court was doing fundamentally in the 1950s civil rights context 
(p. 208), while Richard Funston (1978) claimed there had always been a Higher-law 
tradition in the United States—whether natural or provincial—where “mere statuto-
ry enactments must accord if they are to be legitimate” and where such a tradition 
was reduced to a written Constitution in the 18
th
 Century placing limits on govern-
ment actions while “guaranteeing certain rights to the individual” (p. 13). He con-
cluded that an “existence of a written [Constitution] presupposes a final arbiter,” that 
is, the Court upholding the “will” of the people by serving as national teacher of 
democratic values through its legal pronouncements (p. 13).  
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My aim in this article is to move beyond the arguments of whether or not ju-
dicial review serves U.S. constitutional politics. And, instead I explore the Court’s 
educative role within a pluralist deliberative democracy (a broader reason-based 
and ethical process). Through a close reading of oral arguments in Brown vs. 
Board of Education (1954) and San Antonio vs. Rodriguez (1973)—two landmark 
cases invoking the Equal Protection Clause of the 14
th
 Amendment to the federal 
Constitution—the article shows how appointed Justices adjudicate individual 
cases on appeal and attempt to educate (through an argumentative, reason-based 
and question-centered process) citizen-litigants and their legal representatives 
about the importance of equality, fairness, and ethical responsibility even prior to 
rendering final decisions on policy controversies that have broader national social, 
political and economic implications. 
2. Employing judicial review in an ethically responsible way 
The concept of judicial review has informed the ways in which the U.S. courts, 
including the Supreme Court, have conducted its constitutional authority and ethi-
cal responsibilities since the Founding. Henry J. Abraham and Barbara A. Perry 
(2003) observe: 
There was no unanimity as to who might arbitrate; and the records of the debates 
at the Constitutional Convention now available to us demonstrate that nearly 
every segment of the incipient governmental framework received at least some 
consideration for the role of arbiter: the states themselves, Congress, the execu-
tive, the judiciary, and several combinations of these. But it was fairly clear that 
the role would fall to the judiciary and that it should include the power of judi-
cial review, which authorizes the Supreme Court to hold unconstitutional, and 
hence unenforceable, any law of official action based upon a law, and any other 
action by a public official that it deems—upon careful reflection and in line with 
the inherited tradition of the law and judicial restraint—to be in conflict with the 
Constitution. (pp. 3–4) 
More presently, the concept of judicial review serves as an interpretive de-
vice for practicing judges allowing them “to consider and overturn any congres-
sional and state legislation or other official governmental action deemed incon-
sistent with the Constitution, Bill of Rights, or federal law” (O’Brien, 2003, p. 23). 
Although judicial review is not explicitly stated in the written Constitution, nor are 
the principles of federalism, checks & balances or the separation of powers, all 
are nonetheless implied in the structure of the document (Rakove, 1996, p. 175).  
David M. O’Brien (2003) suggests the Constitution “amounts to a prescrip-
tion for political struggle and an invitation for an ongoing debate about enduring 
constitutional principles” (p. 24). Yet, James B. Thayer (1893) previously found 
that judicial review had some historical precedent in the common law, and more 
importantly, in certain state constitutions at the time of the founding of the  
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Republic (pp. 132–134). Thus, there are historical and constitutional sources sup-
porting the concept and use of judicial review as a tool for judges within the 
American liberal democratic order. 
Moreover, John H. Ely (1980) and Cass Sunstein (1993) provide separate norma-
tive arguments for the legitimate use of judicial review as part of a justice’s constitu-
tional duties. Ely reads the Constitution as principally a procedural document, which 
protects the notion of popular sovereignty via judges who serve as guardians of de-
mocracy. He claims the Court should police the politics behind policy-making and 
policy-outcomes in certain circumstances: a legislative action should be overturned as 
unconstitutional, if and only if, it results from a malfunctioning or a defective demo-
cratic process (pp. 100–104). By democratic process, Ely means legitimate representa-
tive politics, elected officials with an elected mandate decide on behalf of constituents. 
Similarly, Sunstein expects the Court to protect individual fundamental rights central 
to liberal democracy, such as free political speech. He requires significant judicial 
intervention to ensure the success of political reforms: the Court should take a more 
“skeptical” approach to classifications based on race, gender, sexual orientation, and 
poverty (p. 43). Consequently, Ely and Sunstein see unelected Justices as active agents 
who must partake in a deliberative process guiding political actions and outcomes 
rendering almost irrelevant Bickel’s “counter-majoritarian difficulty” concerns. There-
fore, judicial review from this broader standpoint, not only would support, but also 
enhance representative democracy, strengthen the policy development process, and 
safeguard citizen’s fundamental rights and ethical values. 
Bickel (1968) does agree that one federal branch of government ought to be the 
final arbiter and concedes this role to the Supreme Court. The “courts have certain 
capacities for dealing with matters of principle” he states, “that legislatures and execu-
tives do not possess” (p. 25). And that only “judges have, or should have, the leisure, 
the training, and the insulation to follow the ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends of 
government” (p. 26). This suggests that judges may possess the tools, skills, and abili-
ties to carry out their important roles within the U.S. democratic order. Yet, Ely notes 
that Bickel shifted his support for the liberal theory of judicial review and became 
a strong critic instead because of the excesses of the Warren Court in the 1950s-1960s. 
(p. 71). 
Still, Bickel claims that by interfering with the policy decisions of popularly 
elected representatives, the Court frustrates the majority’s policy preferences. 
He argues,  
Judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our system. [And] when the 
Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an 
elected executive, it thwarts the will of the representatives of the actual people of 
the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing majority, 
but against it. That, without mystic overtones, is what actually happens. It is an 
altogether different kettle of fish, and it is the reason the charge can be made that 
judicial review is undemocratic. (pp. 16–17)   
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Bickel ignores the internal organization and structure of the legislative bodies, 
which often attenuate the relationship between popular preferences and legislative 
policy outcomes (e.g. federal or state statutes). He relies on an unstated assumption 
that we can identify and translate the people’s preferences as an aggregate and read 
into legislative outcomes. 
3. National seminar metaphor: Making sense of the Court’s 
educative role 
The “educative” institution inquiry is not new and thus has been pursued by sever-
al political scientists and public law scholars. On the one hand, Richard Funston 
(1978) claims that the Court teaches the American people by producing well-
reasoned opinions about the “philosophic ramifications” of the popular branches’ 
laws or acts (p. 217). Accordingly, he suggests the Court teaches as it accomplish-
es its constitutional function “as a legitimating institution, bringing the nation’s 
short-run, expedient means into accord with its long-run ends or principles” 
(p. 217). On the other hand, Christopher Eisgruber (1962) offers that the Justices 
instead educate “not by propounding scholarly doctrines, but by offering ad homi-
nem lessons capable of inspiring Americans to honor their values” (p. 961). Nev-
ertheless, Funston and Eisgruber are not the only scholars to appropriate in one 
form or another Rostow’s (1952) metaphor “a vital national seminar.” Bickel and 
Gerald Rosenberg (1993) separately considered such a grand vision with the Su-
preme Court at the head of the table. Bickel (1968) states: 
The educational institution that both takes the observation to correct the dead reck-
oning and makes it known is the voice of the Constitution: the Supreme Court ex-
ercising judicial review. The Justices, in Dean Rostow’s phrase, “are inevitably 
teachers in a vital national seminar.” No other branch […] is nearly so well 
equipped to conduct one. And such a seminar can do great deal to keep our society 
from becoming so riven that no court will be able to save it. Of course, we have 
never quite been that society in which the spirit of moderation is so richly in flower 
that no court needs to save it. (Bickel, 1968, p. 26; Rostow, 1952, p. 208) 
But simply to assert that Justices can be educators, as Bickel does and Rostow 
before him, leads to several important questions: To what extent are they teachers? 
What kind of teachers? And how does this supposed educational institutional role fit 
within an American democracy characterized as majoritarian? To reiterate an earlier 
point, the main contention about judicial review is that the Supreme Court’s actions 
against elected legislative bodies are counter-majoritarian and therefore undemocrat-
ic. This objection rests on questionable if not weak assumptions: (1) that a majority 
of eligible voters do in fact elect their political representatives in a given election, or 
(2) that the preferences of citizens within the American democratic order are easily 
aggregated and thus made the “majority.”   
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According to the majoritarian premise, democracy is improved when it is de-
signed to produce collective decisions that reflect majority preferences and con-
sensus. This “counter-majoritarian” claim attempts to make sense of a presumed 
tension between judicial review and American democracy. Bickel (1968) offers an 
exception to his undemocratic claim that judicial review could be justified demo-
cratically speaking only if it adds something significant to government that is 
otherwise lacking (p. 58). Moreover, since the legislative process is unprincipled, 
the Court through judicial review should inject principles (or ethical values) into 
the American governmental system. But Bickel’s point is premised on the Court’s 
ability to promote such values through judicial opinions. Yet, I agree with Bickel 
about the Court’s influence in the system. However, I think that the Court, as the 
evidence shows, might have a constitutional duty to guide others into affirming 
and adhering democratic rights and ethical values but prior to legal pronounce-
ments. In this sense, political responsibilities include injecting ethical values dur-
ing oral arguments but also upholding fundamental rights—equality, and fair-
ness—as significant elements sustaining U.S. liberal-democracy life. 
As for Rosenberg (1993), he provides a test of the “vital national seminar” 
thesis (p. 9) as he examines “whether and under what conditions, courts can pro-
duce significant social reform” (p. 336). Yet, his argument is anchored on the 
same underlying premise, relied on by Bickel, Funston and Eisgruber, that says an 
educative component to the Court’s functions exists but as measured by the impact 
or compliance of legal pronouncements. However, Rosenberg is less concerned 
with the educative role than with assessing whether or not the Court is a catalyst 
for social change, or whether the Court has determinative power in American 
politics and society. Consequently, he explores what the Court ought to do and not 
what it really can do. He does conclude that the Court has been ineffective in pro-
ducing social change or “policy change with nationwide impact” (1993, p. 4). 
Although Rosenberg does not directly address the question regarding whether 
or how, if ever, the Court performs an educative role within the American political 
system, he does provide some hope:  
If the Court was consequential in civil rights, then its influence should be identi-
fiable and measurable. The more places in which it can be identified, the strong-
er the claim is. On the other hand, the fewer places in which it is found, the less 
likely it is that the effect of the Court is as powerful as the Dynamic Court view 
contends. (1993, p. 108) 
Rosenberg (1993, p. 108) distinguishes between two views of the Court:  
(1) Dynamic Court view—the Court protects minorities and defends liberty 
in the face of opposition from popular branches of government, fulfilling 
an important role within the American political order, and  
(2) Constrained Court view—the Court lacks the power of the “sword or 
purse,” the Court’s ability to produce political or social change is limited, 
and can do little than point out how actions have fallen short of constitu-
tional or legislative requirements and hope that appropriate action is taken.  
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Rosenberg finds that “most Americans neither follow Supreme Court deci-
sions nor understand the Court’s constitutional role” (1993, p. 131). What he sug-
gests then is for groups or individuals not to waste their resources on litigation, but 
rather they ought to engage in widespread mobilization as the only meaningful 
path to social change. Moreover, he asserts, “the combination of growing civil 
rights pressure from the 1930s, economic changes, the Cold War, population 
shifts, electoral concerns, and the increase in mass communication all created the 
pressure that led to civil rights. The Court reflected that pressure; it did not create 
it” (p. 169). In sum, Rosenberg provides a list of historical “causal” factors that 
may explain the civil rights movement, but does not give any credit to the Court 
for playing a pertinent role in such a movement.
1
  
This failure I would submit (if we can correlate change with educating) arises 
from Rosenberg’s focus on the impact of the Court’s decisions, and not the law-
making process itself. Still, it seems that Rosenberg leaves the door open for such 
a possibility: 
Social scientists do not understand well enough the dynamics of influence and 
causation to state with certainty that the claims of Court influence (or any other 
causal claims) are right or wrong.  Similarly, social scientists do not understand 
fully the myriad of factors that are involved in an individual’s reaching a politi-
cal decision. Ideas seem to have feet of their own, and tracking their footsteps is 
an imperfect science. Thus, even if I find little or no evidence of extra-judicial 
influence, it is simply impossible to state with certainty that the Court did not 
produce significant social reform in civil rights. (1993, p. 108) 
Not surprisingly, Rosenberg believes that other forms of empirical analysis 
need to be conducted beyond social impact or institutional compliance studies, 
which are based on judicial opinions. 
Recall that Funston (1978) did consider this issue within his “national semi-
nar” metaphor and the Court’s constitutional functions. I agree with him: if the 
ends of government is to be based on principle, then “some agency must, in 
the normal operations of the policy process, be concerned with society’s funda-
mental, underlying values [...] that agency should be the Supreme Court, and in 
fact, in American politics, it can only be the Court” (Funston, 1978, p. 49). I also 
agree that through judicial review the Court may appeal to “the majority to take 
a sober second look at the course it has set for the nation,” however not with how 
 
                                                          
1 Rosenberg does highlight three constraints the Court must overcome, which may then lead to produc-
ing social reform: (1) The limited nature of constitutional rights; (2) The lack of judicial independence, 
and (3) The judiciary’s lack of implementation power. He finds that when certain conditions are met, 
the Court can produce limited change: if it overcomes constraint (1), there is ample legal precedent for 
change; if it overcomes constraint (2), there is support for change from substantial members of Con-
gress and the executive; and if it overcomes constraint (3), there is support from citizens (or at mini-
mum low levels of opposition); along with one other condition from the following: when other actors 
offer incentives for compliance, when other actors impose costs to non-compliance, when implementa-
tion of opinions can be left to the private market, and when individuals crucial for implementation are 
seeking either political leverage or cover and are willing to act (1993, pp. 35–36). 
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this should be done. Funston emphasizes the impact of the Court’s educating prac-
tices as legitimating legislative policy outcomes since Justices are involved in 
a “gradual building of constitutional doctrine” (Funston, 1978, p. 51). 
A difference emerges between Eisgruber, Funston and Rosenberg. Eisgruber 
(1962) introduces a different theoretical argument to the “educative institution” 
debate. His claim is that “the Supreme Court cannot be fully understood except as 
an institution with educative responsibilities, responsibilities that depend upon the 
excellence of its arguments” (p. 964). According to Eisgruber, the Court teaches 
ethical principles to the American people through its opinions, which leads to 
lessons that are ad hominem descriptions of American political identity. This 
identity leads to motivating action. Thus, “what distinguishes the Court as an 
educative institution,” Eisgruber argues, “is not its knowledge of ethical theories; 
rather, it is the Court’s understanding of its audience” (p. 985). 
Eisgruber seems to rely on an implied assumption that either American val-
ues are universal and absolute, or that the American people are a sum of heteroge-
neous individuals but with similar goals in adhering to certain principles that com-
ply with a fixed notion of liberal citizenship. This might be problematic in the 
same sense that democracy is said to be majoritarian. Moreover, his view of the 
Court seems elitist and at odds with an egalitarian perspective stating that 
the Court may not be the only but might be the most appropriate expounder of 
ethical values in U.S. political life, and thus shaper of identity, although it rarely 
teaches: “Indeed, the Supreme Court might be an essential source of explanations 
directed to American political identity even if the Court is neither the only nor the 
most prolific source” (1962, p. 989). I might agree with the infrequency of 
the educating role but not with such an isolated place for the Court since it would 
undermine its position as a “co-equal” institution in relation to the other two fed-
eral bodies. Nonetheless, Eisgruber provides a useful theoretical framework in 
which to check the Court’s source of its educative role as a point of comparison: 
“The constitutional structure gives the Supreme Court both an incentive and an 
opportunity to supply educative descriptions of American identity” (p. 1004). 
Although Eisgruber (1962) focuses on the impact of written opinions and 
how through such the Court teaches about key fundamental values and constitu-
tional principles to the American people, which in turn motivates them towards ta-
king ethical responsibilities seriously, I nonetheless disagree with his observation 
that empirically “the Court is exceptionally well-suited to produce essential les-
sons about ethical matters; but that [it] fails to do so, or that nobody listens when it 
does” (p. 1029). There is an important distinction between my views and both 
Funston and Eisgruber. They both proceed from the premise that judicial pro-
nouncements are the catalyst, if not the source, of the Court’s educative institu-
tional role. I instead argue that what, and who is being taught and the how it is 
taught may be inherent in the where and when; that is, the Court’s educative role, 
and the content of its teaching seem to manifest through oral arguments prior to 
the Court’s legal pronouncements. Thus, oral argument proceedings may serve as 
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the source of the Court’s educative as well as reveal the substance being taught as 
the Justices attempt to resolve concrete constitutional disputes for those involved 
in the litigation but with far-reaching implications. 
Now some may ask: How does a non-elected Court see itself as an educative 
institution? To answer this question, we need to reverse our tracks a bit before 
proceeding forward. As scholars we understand that in a republican form of gov-
ernment, a citizen’s vote is used primarily to elect representatives to the legisla-
tures (federal and state) and an executive (though not directly through the Elec-
toral College), which themselves select judges whose role it is to ensure that the 
“government” does not violate fundamental rights and values as embodied in 
the Constitution and elsewhere or otherwise upset the basic agreements that under-
lie political institutions. This may sound dramatic but the whole point of an inde-
pendent judiciary is to be “antidemocratic” in its institutional role (in a majoritari-
an democracy), in order to preserve from transient majorities those human 
individual rights and other principles to which an American Liberal-democratic 
order is committed. Without this there would be nothing to stop a bare majority of 
citizens from deciding that the minority should be for example “enslaved.” This is 
of course moot in a pluralist democracy because of its various protective mecha-
nisms. In other words, in order for such a scenario to occur empirically, we would 
have to lay aside the bicameral legislature, Senate filibuster, presidential veto, 
representative government, just to name a few. 
4. An alternative model: Pluralist deliberative democracy 
What does it mean for unelected judges to exist in a “co-equal” manner within 
a deliberative democratic order? Terri Perreti (1999) recognizes that Bickel and 
others ignored the possibility that judicial review is reconcilable with, and neces-
sary to American democracy. She asserts that this problem “is due to their mis-
guided view of American democracy as majoritarian, electorally controlled, and 
legislative centered” (pp. 229–230). Rather she submits that American democracy 
is better understood as pluralist. 
Our political system is not directed to the goal of majority rule; it is in virtually 
all aspects an anti-majoritarian system, including its rejection of legislative su-
premacy. Rather, our system provides numerous and diverse political institu-
tions, none of which is hierarchically superior to another, whether in theory or 
practice. The underlying purpose is to provide groups, especially minorities, 
with a variety of arenas in which to advance their interests and contest poli- 
cies with which they disagree. Accordingly, denigrating the Court for interfering 
with the definitive and presumptively superior electoral and legislative determi-
nations of political winners, at least in the context of pluralist politics, makes lit-
tle sense. (Perreti, 1999, p. 229) 
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In this pluralist system, judicial review is neither deviant nor illegitimate. Ra-
ther, it is a quite normal expression of the pluralist principles of redundancy and 
diversity in political representation. (Perreti, 1999, p. 230) 
Perreti reorients the historical and theoretical debate on democracy making 
room for judicial review as the Court’s initial form of democratic intervention.  
Accordingly, in order to support this “co-equal” institution claim (or institutional 
egalitarianism), we must characterize American democracy not as majoritarian but 
as pluralist. Hence, as a pluralist democracy, the American representative system 
becomes more inclusive, politically and socially balanced.   
However, without a notion of deliberation, even a pluralist democratic gov-
ernment falls short of creating and maintaining political equality, fairness and 
liberty. Scholars have understood that “the success or failure of deliberation de-
pends […] on its context” (Thompson, 2008, p. 499), but also on the potential for 
diversity of political views and even ideological perspectives (Besson & Marti, 
2006). 
Chantal Mouffe (2005) offers the following as a way to think about the con-
nections between pluralism, social conflicts and democracy: “[A]gonistic [or an 
argumentative] confrontation is the […] condition of [democracy’s] existence […] 
a pluralist […] democratic society does not deny the existence of conflicts but 
provides the institutions allowing them to be expressed in an adversarial form” 
(p. 30). Moreover, political and legal antagonisms are both inherent characteristics 
within diverse human social relations (Figueroa, 2014; Mouffe, 1999, p. 754). As 
such, the U.S. citizen, especially those seeking legal redress for political, social 
and economic issues, becomes more apt to perceive, and accept the Court’s vari-
ous roles within a pluralist deliberative democracy since it would serve as another 
institution open to discussion for resolving conflicts that are not adequately ad-
dressed by elected officials in coordinate branches. 
Another way to consider deliberative democracy is as a process for commu-
nication where citizens “exchange reasons for their preferences, rather than solely 
voting on them [and these] individual preferences are not (pre-politically) fixed 
and might change as a result of collective deliberation, which also promises great-
er democratic legitimacy” (Marsh, Ercan & Furlong, 2017, p. 195). So, at the 
center of deliberative democracy is the notion of “reason-giving”, which means, in 
terms of the Court’s power of review and educative role, that citizen-litigants and 
their lawyer-representatives in oral arguments “are expected to justify the laws 
[and values] they would impose […] by giving reasons for their [legal] claims and 
responding to others’ reasons in return” (p. 498). Marti (2017) says it best,  
[Pluralism] and disagreement is not only pervasive and unavoidable in demo-
cratic, open societies, but also morally valuable.  But pluralism is morally valua-
ble because values are plural themselves and it is a necessary condition of lively, 
open democratic politics. What is more, disagreement must be seen as a “prima-
ry creative source of deliberation.” (p. 563) 
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Disagreements come in different forms, political, legislative, regulatory, con-
stitutional and adjudicative, among others (Marti, 2017, p. 564). Thus, as I have 
been suggesting, this deliberative democratic process occurs not only in the ordi-
nary political arena, but also in legal spaces, in particular the Supreme Court as 
a “co-equal” institution during oral arguments.   
However, when constitutional meaning is contested and fundamental rights 
seemed undermined, why does a “co-equal” Court get to “say what the law is” and 
trump the constitutional understandings of the other branches? In what sense is the 
Court speaking for the “will” of the people in such cases of interpretative or politi-
cal uncertainty? To these questions, Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. 
(1972) commented: 
The Justices are charged with deciding according to law. Because the issues 
arise in the framework of concrete litigation they must be decided on facts em-
balmed in a record made by some lower court or administrative agency. And 
while the Justices may and do consult history and the other disciplines as aids to 
constitutional decision, the text of the Constitution and relevant precedents deal-
ing with that text are their primary tools. (p. 38) 
Justice Brennan, Jr. proposes that the constitutional duty Justices have is crit-
ically important to the democratic experience overall. So the important notion is 
“concreteness” where the Court does its work at the level of appellate reviews in 
which oral argument is heard, competing interpretations of constitutional provi-
sions are debated, and citizens’ fundamental democratic rights and values are 
clarified and shaped but with the Constitution as the guiding force in the process. 
This is where the people’s “will” is present throughout the process.  
To be clear, I am not suggesting the Court—in implying institutional egalitar-
ianism through the assertion of judicial review—is undermining the importance of 
other political institutions. Rather, if we characterize American democracy as 
pluralist and deliberative, then the Court has a legitimate “co-equal” institutional 
responsibility to protect the people’s “will” by focusing first on the individual 
litigants and subsequently on protecting the integrity of the whole system and its 
fundamental values. This would once again raise the judicial supremacy objection, 
as Bickel (1968) states, “judicial review is a deviant institution in the American 
democracy” (p. 18). Nevertheless, I argue rather that its “co-equal” status, under 
a pluralist deliberative democracy, is best understood in terms of the Court ad-
vancing liberal-democratic values—equality, fairness and ethical responsibility—
within its educative capabilities during oral arguments.  
5. Foundations of Court’s “co-equal” institutional status 
We can trace the source of the “co-equal” institutional status argument—in the 
context of civil rights and liberties—to footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene 
Products (304 U.S. 144 [1938]). Footnote 4 appeared one year after the Supreme 
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Court abandoned its previous laissez faire position in defense of the economic 
rights of businesses and employers. Typically in such cases, the Court had applied 
“strict scrutiny” judicial review2 on legislation affecting property rights to deter-
mine whether it served a legitimate public purpose and was reasonable in its 
terms. Most importantly before 1937, the Court was hostile to congressional at-
tempts to intervene in the private sphere to protect farmers, laborers, children and 
other vulnerable groups (Abraham, 2003, pp. 91–93; O’Brien, 2003, pp. 1309–
1310). In footnote 4, Justice Stone recognized a need to acknowledge and focus on 
the “will” of the ordinary people. As Davis and Graham (1995) state,    
A novel jurisprudence was in its embryonic stage of development, and racial and 
ethnic minorities would be its recipients. A legal weapon had been devised that 
would transform the constitutional order in the area of civil liberties. The consti-
tutional significance of footnote 4 lies in its justification for a higher degree of 
scrutiny, or strict scrutiny, against legislation that discriminates against discrete 
and insular minorities. (p. 77)   
The Court seems to serve multiple functions—legal, political and educa-
tive—when it protects individual liberties, societal values and overall fundamental 
rights as a democratic guardian to the people (Goldstein, 1987, pp. 391, 402–403), 
while not over-estimating its egalitarian institutional implied powers within the 
pluralist constitutional system in which it finds itself. 
Jacob W. Landynski (1982) shows the significance of the Court’s use of judi-
cial review as part of a necessary element to engaging in deliberative democratic 
practices as a “co-equal” institution. 
Ordinarily the political system is adequate to defend individual liberties. When it 
is not, the Court’s role must be redefined to allow broader judicial review as 
a substitute for the political review which [vulnerable minority] groups were un-
able to effectively to obtain. In effect, the Court appoints itself a surrogate legis-
lature, judicially awarding the legislative bargains it believes these groups would 
themselves have struck were they politically influential. In such circumstances, 
judicial activism becomes defensible as a safeguard for democratic principles, 
for the Court can be seen as aiding democracy rather than blocking it; as giving 
expression to the political process rather than negating it. (pp. 37–38) 
Landynski’s eloquent statement reflects similar thoughts by Chief Justice 
Earl Warren who, in 1968, stated that the Supreme Court had the political and 
perhaps ethical responsibility to “always stand ready to advance the rights of [...] 
minorities, if the executive and legislative branches falter” (The Philadelphia In-
quirer, p. 1). Both Landynski and Warren point to the importance of Justice 
Stone’s footnote 4 to American political and constitutional development. Stone’s 
 
                                                          
2 The Court applies different levels—strict scrutiny, intermediate to rational—in order to determine the 
constitutionality of a law. Cf. http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/epcscrutiny.htm 
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seemingly innocuous statement eventually led to the Court’s shift towards protect-
ing civil rights and liberties of political and social minorities by the mid-twentieth 
Century.
3
    
6. Supreme Court in brief historical context through  
the 1950s–1970s 
We know that “successful democracies tend to qualify the central principle of 
majority rule in order to protect minority rights” (Schmitter & Lynn Karl, 1996, 
p. 53) and American democracy is no different in a situation where the Jim Crow
4
 
segregationist regime (government mandated segregated public facilities for 
whites and blacks) continued to violate the constitutional rights of black American 
citizens and others immediately after the Civil War and even after the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments (13
th
, 14
th
 & 15
th
) were implemented. Adolph Reed, Jr. (2004) 
argues that this majority rule qualification extended through the 1960s: 
The segregationist regime in the South encompassed far more than the “separate 
but equal” doctrine that Brown overturned in public education, far more than the 
petty apartheid reflected in Whites Only or Colored Only signs. It was a codified 
social order, a system of state-sponsored and state-enforced racial domination. It 
wasn’t about prejudice and bigotry. Though it certainly fed on and legitimized 
both, it was fundamentally about who could claim the rights and protections of 
citizenship and who couldn’t. And it was always at least as much about impos-
ing and stabilizing a pattern of social relations rooted in the political economy’s 
class and power dynamics as it was about formal commitment to an ideology of 
white supremacy. 
It was also finite. It was the expression of reactionary elite’s victory in the nearly 
thirty-year struggle over the terms on which a post-slavery Southern social order 
would be built. The Jim Crow regime sanctified in the infamous Plessy doctrine 
was only fully consolidated between 1890 and 1910. Its institutional back was 
broken by 1965. That is, all four of my grandparents were at least adolescents by 
the time the system was solidly entrenched; its legal foundations were destroyed 
before I was old enough to vote. 
Brown was both illustration of and impetus for that change. It was also a culmi-
nation of decades of careful strategizing and organizing, of protracted legal 
                                                          
3 On this critical historical point, Louis Fisher (1999) states, “In 1938, at a time when the Supreme 
Court was withdrawing its scrutiny of economic regulation, Justice Stone wrote a footnote indicating 
that the court had a special obligation to protect minority rights. Justice Stone’s formulation later 
evolved into “strict scrutiny” analysis for protecting fundamental rights, including issues of race dis-
crimination and other concerns about the category of race, as Brown would subsequently demonstrate” 
(p. 874). 
4 For more on Jim Crow character, cf. https://www.ferris.edu/HTMLS/news/jimcrow/who/index.htm. 
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struggle, against one facet of the segregationist order—a point where its sepa-
rate-but-equal sophistry was most vulnerable—led by the NAACP and its allies.5  
After the Court’s 1937 shift towards protecting insular minority rights, jus-
tices mostly adhered to their constitutional obligations, and ethical commitments 
in advancing social change challenging Jim Crow laws that undermined liberal 
democratic values, i.e. freedom and equality. 
During the early 1950s through the mid-1970s, the Court focused on protecting 
the civil rights and liberties of various minority groups, and enhancing equality 
norms and ethical standards by relying on the Equal Protection Clause of the 14
th
 
Amendment to the federal Constitution (Araiza, Haddon & Roberts, 2006, pp. 803–
805, 888–908; Fisher, 1999, pp. 874–898, 1024–1028). Moreover, the Court in this 
period of intense struggles against racial, class and gender discrimination—where 
legally sanctioned Jim Crow activities were entrenched in the American South and 
more subtle in the North—at times provided, although in somewhat tangential ways, 
instruction to Americans on the importance of liberal democratic life.   
Two questions arise at this point that need to be addressed: How does the Court 
educate the American people about fundamental liberal values? And how does an 
educative Court serve democracy? I argue the Court often serves democracy when it 
grants appeals, hears oral arguments, and pronounces law in order to uphold the 
integrity of the democratic order. Although the Court may have failed to do so in the 
San Antonio case as discussed later. Nevertheless, Justice Felix Frankfurter, who 
was a proponent of judicial restraint
6
 (Frisch & Stevens, 1973, p. 337), suggested 
that judicial review, in the case of Brown, at times served society as a whole, espe-
cially when the Court corrects the wrongs of elected legislative bodies.   
The Court does its duty if it gets effectively under way the righting of a wrong. 
When the wrong is deeply rooted state policy the court does its duty if it decrees 
measures that reverse the direction of the unconstitutional policy so as to uproot 
it “with all deliberate speed.” (O’Brien, 2003, p. 1390; Levinson, 2000, p. 149) 
Yet, Justice Frankfurter’s point could also extend to the Court providing 
a solid foundation for an implicit “co-equal” educator institutional role, regardless 
of ideological or even philosophical commitments. 
David O’Brien (2003) rightly suggested that the last phrase pronounced in 
Brown II “with all deliberate speed” symbolized the Court’s ethical appeal and 
adherence to the “will of the people” as a “co-equal” institution (p. 1390). In its 
role, the Court confronts, explores, and tries to make sense of the social, political 
and economic issues raised in appeal, especially if the legislative branch or lower 
courts only provide cursory treatment of these issues. This latter responsibility 
                                                          
5 Cf. https://www.thenation.com/article/beyond-black-white-and-brown/. 
6 The theory that says judges should limit the use of their own powers of interpretation, and rather defer 
to the concrete constitutional issues before them and strict reading of the law. More on judicial re-
straint, cf. https://www.britannica.com/topic/judicial-restraint. 
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begins when the Court grants appellate reviews, and then schedules oral argu-
ments, or what I call “national seminars for democratic education.”   
To this end, the Court has also evolved over the years into setting the politi-
cal and social agenda from within the internal adjudication process. For instance, 
historically the Court has indicated which kinds of cases and issues are worthy of 
judicial review. Sanford Levinson (2000), comments in the context of the activist 
Warren Court of the 1950s–1960s, for example: 
It is not so much that the Supreme Court had taken on a dramatically new role— 
its primary concern at this period continued to be civil liberties and civil rights—
as that it displayed a willingness to confront a host of important issues head-on 
and become, in important ways, a significant agenda settler for domestic policy. 
(p. 150) 
However, why should we be more attentive to oral arguments since only 
a few people are involved in them and even less hears them? These arguments are 
not as public as other political events (e.g. congressional hearings, legislative 
debates in Congress, or judicial opinions), and thus, lack the audience necessary 
for any significant impact or educating for that matter? Why are public education 
cases—one on school segregation and the other on distribution of public revenue 
—good test cases for exploring the Court’s educative role? The oral arguments are 
primary sources in which an “educative” element is most inherent in the way 
I have suggested. The assumption is that the Supreme Court educates during oral 
argument since traditional legal training is rooted in the Socratic Method in which 
questions are used for teaching and learning, and thus Justices employ this educat-
ing form in their attempts to resolve constitutional disputes on appeal. Moreover, 
during oral argument we find the intersection of several key constituents within 
American society: the ordinary citizen (litigant), the agent or representative of 
aggrieved individual (legal counsel), the arbiter (Justices), the select media, and 
general public (gallery). With respect to the cases selected, the Brown case focuses 
on discrimination against racial minorities and San Antonio case mostly on dis-
crimination against the poor and their fundamental rights as citizens. Last, we 
know that historically racial and economic justice in the context of citizenship and 
constitutional laws have defined U.S. life since the Founding of the republic 
(Smith, 1997; Zinn, 1995). These two cases are linked together by a common 
constitutional thread: the Equal Protection Clause of the 14
th
 Amendment in the 
context of public education. 
The Court’s ethical responsibilities are “to define and vindicate rights guaran-
teed by Constitution, to assure uniformity of federal law, and to maintain constitu-
tional distribution of powers in our federal Union” (Report of the Study Group, 
1972, pp. 573, 578). To this extent, I have been arguing that within the Court’s 
constitutional duties rest an educative function—as reflected in some oral argu-
ments where participants deal with various levels of “disagreements” in delibera-
tive fashion. Justices know that they have an adjudicative responsibility to explain 
their decisions to the American public and so use the oral argument, which pre-
cede such written explanation as a space to instruct, interrogate and guide those 
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involved in the appeals process directly and others interested in such proceeding 
(i.e., media, and others for predictive purposes).   
Yet, we need to remind ourselves that in regards to the oral argument, 
the Supreme Court does have some institutional constraints when providing “edu-
cative” interventions. “Judicial intervention is permissible when legislative or 
executive actions clearly violate specific constitutional prohibitions (e.g. the Bill 
of Rights)” (Keynes, 1991, p. 65). There may be two notions of such interven-
tions:  
(1) A process in which the Court takes an activist approach to constitutional 
interpretation,  
(2) A process by which Justices pose different types of questions during oral 
arguments—to guide, instruct, and clarify various concepts, categories, 
values, principles and rights.  
The latter notion is most important at present because it points to how the Court deals 
with concrete constitutional disputes that not only have personal short-term implica-
tions but also larger long-term resonance in reference to democracy as a value. 
7. Supreme Court’s educative role within a pluralist 
deliberative democracy 
In this section, I examine the Court’s “educative” role by interpreting portions of 
oral arguments in Brown v. Board of Education (1954),
7
 and San Antonio v. Ro-
driguez (1973).
8
 It is important to look closely at how the Justices themselves use 
linguistic techniques, rhetorical devices and pose probing value-laden questions 
during these deliberations. Questions are essential to the Court’s ethically based 
educative role. David A. Hollinger finds that general discourse in our society, and 
the questions that informs it, are central to how and why individuals resolve com-
munal disputes at any level. “Questions are the points of contact between minds, 
where agreements are consolidated and where differences are acknowledged and 
dealt with; questions are the dynamisms whereby membership in a community of 
discourse is established, renewed, and sometimes terminated” (Hollinger, 1979, 
p. 43).  
Historically, Justices have had to maintain at least five assumptions in per-
forming their educative roles (Hugh, 2002, p. 16):  
(1) that the American people expect laws to be clear and easily understood, 
(2) that the laws reflect the choices made by those who write and shape such 
laws while respecting the principle of popular sovereignty, and liberal 
values of fairness, equality and individualism,  
                                                          
7 347 U.S. 483 (1954) argued December 9, 1952 and reargued on December 9, 1953 and decided on 
May 17, 1954 by a 9 to 0 vote. Brown II, re-argument on the question of relief (remedies) from April 
11–14, 1954 and decided on May 31, 1955 by a 9 to 0 vote. 
8 411 U.S. 1 (1973), argued October 12, 1972 and decided on March 21, 1973 by a 5 to 4 vote revers-
ing lower federal District Court decision. 
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(3) that the American people expect the laws to be consistent, stable, and pre-
dictable,  
(4) that the laws “conform to the settled expectations of society” and “con-
tribute to societal coherence,” and  
(5) that the American people expect the laws “to be flexible enough to adapt 
to a changing society, so that it may reflect contemporary notions of jus-
tice.”  
These guide Justices as they maintain a general constitutional balancing act 
while resolving concrete disputes on appeal, in particular during oral argument. 
 
 
7.1. Brown vs. Board of Education (1952–1955) 
The oral arguments in Brown took place between December 1952 and April 1955. 
There were ten oral arguments in total: In 1952, there were three, held December 
9–11; in 1953, there were also three, December 7–9; and in 1955, there were four, 
April 11–14. These arguments show the Court guiding, interrogating, and instruct-
ing the parties before them in its attempts to deal with the issue of racial segrega-
tion in public education and illuminating the importance of equality, fairness and 
justice in democratic life. 
In 1952, the Court heard oral arguments for the first time in the case of 
Brown. The appellants (those representing the elementary school children) and 
appellees (the Board of Education representatives) presented their respective ar-
guments where the Plessy doctrine of “separate-but-equal”9 and the notion of 
“diversity in society” guided deliberations from the start. Brown I was really an 
amalgamation of several cases originating in four different states—Kansas, South 
Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. The legal question was whether segregation of 
children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical 
facilities and other “tangible” factors may be equal, deprived children of a racial 
minority group of equal education opportunities. The appellants (Brown) contend-
ed that segregated public schools were not equal and cannot be made equal. This 
inequality fundamentally deprived “Negro race children” the equal protection of 
the laws. On the other hand, the appellees (Board) sought to persuade the Court to 
uphold the lower court’s conclusion that the tangibles were equal although the 
public elementary schools were segregated by race. Thus, the appellees did not 
want the Court to pursue a direct attack on the Plessy doctrine of “separate-but-
equal.” 
In regards to the adoption of the 14
th
 Amendment and the later Plessy doc-
trine, the Court claimed, “We cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the [14th] 
Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy was written. Must consid-
er public education in the light of its full development and its present place in 
                                                          
9 163 U.S. 537. The Court held that a Louisiana statute providing for separate but equal accommoda-
tions on railroads for Negroes and whites did not violate the Constitution. This law was subsequently 
cited as the source of the “separate but equal” doctrine. 
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American life throughout the Nation” (p. 487). Despite appellees’ plea for original 
intent—when judges seek textual meaning based on what the Constitution’s fram-
ers intended (Powell, 1985)—during the oral argument, the Justices also consid-
ered the present 1950s status of public education. Chief Justice Earl Warren 
writes: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local gov-
ernments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for 
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to 
our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public 
responsibilities [...] It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is 
a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him 
[her] for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his 
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be ex-
pected to succeed in life if he [she] is denied the opportunity of an education. 
Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right, 
which must be made available to all on equal terms.10 
This well-articulated ethically grounded statement suggests an adherence to 
the Court’s implied educative function mandated by the social and political cir-
cumstances of the time. This view on equality and fairness was not shared in the 
San Antonio case, however.  
We see one example of the Court’s educative role in the following exchange. 
During opening arguments on December 9, 1952, Mr. Robert L. Carter, Assistant 
Counsel to NAACP (legal-representative of the appellants) was speaking until 
Justice Harold H. Burton intervened:   
JUSTICE BURTON: It is your position that there is a great deal more to the educa-
tional process even in the elementary school than what you read in the books? 
(Friedman, 1969, p. 17)  
This query led Mr. Carter to confirm his position regarding the intangibles 
involved in education, and how these apply to the equal protection clause, and 
broader issue of social equality. 
MR. CARTER: Yes, sir. We say that the question of your physical facilities is not 
enough. The Constitution does not, in terms of protecting, giving equal protec-
tion of the laws with regard to equal education opportunities, does not stop 
with the fact that you have equal physical facilities, but it covers the whole edu-
cational process. (Friedman, 1969, p. 17) 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 The Brown case. https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/347/483 
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Carter thus argued that the Plessy doctrine was not controlling because of dif-
ferent facts presented in their current case, and reasoned that the state’s sanctioned 
racial classification structure (one category requiring strict scrutiny
11
 by the 
Court), for the purpose of public elementary education fundamentally, violated 
the equal protection of the laws.  
MR. CARTER: It is our position that Plessy is not in point here; that it had nothing 
to do with educational opportunities whatsoever.  We further take the posi-
tion that whatever the court below may have felt about the reach of the Plessy 
case that this Court in the Sweatt case made it absolutely clear that Plessy had 
nothing to do with the question of education. (Friedman, 1969, p. 18) 
Justice Burton’s initial question attempting to seek clarification afforded 
Carter the chance to elaborate further on his position. This deliberative exchange 
shows some of the Court’s educative character as Justices guided legal counsel 
towards recognizing constitutional precedents even at the expense of the latter’s 
overall position. As Justice Felix Frankfurter’s intervening question displays. 
JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: The more specific question I would like to put to you is 
this: Do we not have to face the fact that what you are challenging is something 
that was written into the public law and adjudications of courts, including this 
Court, by a large body of decisions and, therefore, the question arises whether, 
and under what circumstances, this Court should now upset so long a course of 
decisions? (Friedman, 1969, p. 20) 
In oral argument, legal counsel must respond to Court questions by referring 
to their overall position, especially as found in the previously submitted appellate 
briefs. Though, it can be said that the Justices with this type of intervention seem 
to indirectly instruct by providing evidence of customary Court’s practices for 
guiding the line of debate towards a certain preferred outcome. Justice Frankfurter 
continues: 
JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: You are quite right in suggesting that this question ex-
plicitly as to segregation in the primary grades has not been adjudicated by this 
Court [...] but I do think we have to face in this case the fact that we are dealing 
with a long-established historical practice by the states, and the assumption of 
the exercise of power which not only was written on the statute books, but has 
been confirmed and adjudicated by state courts, as well as by the expressions of 
this Court. (Friedman, 1969, p. 21) 
 
                                                          
11 The Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment is designed to prevent discrimination against 
certain classes of people. This is done when the Supreme Court applies different levels—strict scrutiny, 
intermediate to rational—in order to determine the constitutionality of a law. Cf. http://law2.umkc.edu/ 
faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/epcscrutiny.htm 
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Justice Frankfurter through his inquiry and statement seems to take a subtle 
educative posture offering implicitly a lesson about up-holding legal precedent 
and historical practice.  Carter is thus prompted to consider an alternative point of 
view, if not confirming his own position, in dealing with concrete issues, but also 
with the understanding that larger ethical, social, political and economic effects 
are at stake. 
Accordingly, Carter feels obligated to move toward more transparency; he 
raises the social inequality issue that had been in the public discourse at the time, 
by challenging more directly Plessy’s ‘separate but equal’ doctrine: 
MR. CARTER: I have no hesitancy in saying to the Court that if they do not agree 
that the decision can be handed down in our favor on this basis [...] that I have 
no hesitancy in saying that the issue of “separate but equal” should be faced and 
ought to be faced, and that in our view the ‘separate but equal’ doctrine should 
be overruled. (Friedman, 1969, p. 21) 
So, the equality issue moves away from tangible factors and into a reconsid-
eration of the Plessy doctrine of “separate but equal.” Carter wanted to know 
whether or not this doctrine applied. The question whether Plessy was good law 
was not addressed immediately, however.  Instead, the Court takes control of the 
deliberative process facilitating the internal educational seminar (p. 22): 
JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: Are you saying that we can say that “separate but equal” 
is not a doctrine that is relevant at the primary school level?  Is that what you are 
saying? 
MR. CARTER: Because in so far as this Court is concerned, as I have indicated 
before, this Court, with the exception of Gong Lum, has not at the elementary 
level adopted that “separate but equal” doctrine. There is no decision in this 
Court, unless the Court feels that Gong Lum v. Rice is that decision. As I at-
tempted to indicate before, that was a case of first impression, although the 
Court did not seem to think it was, and that here actually we are now being pre-
sented—the Court is now being presented—with a case of first impression, when 
it has a full record, which you can give full consideration to, and that Gong Lum, 
which did not squarely raise the issue, ought not to be controlling. All I am say-
ing is that you do not have to overrule “separate but equal” at the elementary 
school level in deciding the Kansas case because you have never decided the 
‘separate but equal’ applied at the elementary school level. 
JUSTICE DOUGLASS: I think you are saying that segregation may be all right in 
streetcars and railroad cars and restaurants, but that is all that we have decided. 
MR. CARTER: That is the only place that you have decided that it is all right. 
JUSTICE DOUGLASS: And that education is different, education is different from that? 
MR. CARTER: Yes, sir. 
JUSTICE DOUGLASS: That is your agreement, is it not?  Isn’t that your argument 
in this case? 
MR. CARTER: Yes. 
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The Justices with these inquiries and comments provide guidance, cues and 
clarification to legal positions, but also suggest possible challenges to certain 
constitutional doctrines (i.e., “separate-but-equal”) threatening at least two funda-
mental values, equality and liberty, to the extent that intangibles are also signifi-
cant to the public school environment.   
At the end of oral arguments, Chief Justice Warren concluded in Brown I, 
that “in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no 
place [and that separate] educational facilities are inherently unequal” (Landynski, 
1983, p. 257). Also Brown II was a re-argument largely devoted to the socio-
historical circumstances surrounding the origins of the 14
th
 Amendment, including 
the Equal Protection Clause. It covered extensively Congress’s deliberations re-
garding the 14
th
 Amendment, ratification by the states, and then existing practices 
in racial segregation and finally the views of the proponents and opponents of the 
Amendments, respectively. 
Finally, the Court concluded that although this information shed some light 
on the dispute at hand, it was not sufficient to resolve the problem.  The Court 
stated, “At best,” the historic evidence was “inconclusive.”  In the fall of 1955, the 
Court announced its second ruling calling for implementation of the 1954 decision 
“with all deliberate speed” but without setting a timetable for such a process 
(Brinkley, 1993, p. 789; Friedman, 1969, p. 535). It probably seems likely that the 
adjudicating process, and subsequent legal outcome, provided the necessary fuel 
for the NAACP and the rest of the civil rights movement to continue challenging 
state laws rooted in racial classifications that violated constitutional law through-
out the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. In another educative moment, Justice Brennan 
said it best in Brown that the Court has the constitutional and ethical responsibility 
to find a balance between upholding democratic ideals (and protecting all citi-
zens), and taking serious account of the rapid complex changing social realities:  
“The claim of the Negro citizen [...] present a ‘conflict between the ideal of liberty 
and equality expressed in the Declaration of Independence, on the one hand, and, 
on the other hand, a way of life rooted in the customs of many of our people’ ” 
(Friedman, 1969, p. 39). 
7.2. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973) 
In San Antonio v. Rodriguez, the Court considered the issue of equality from 
a different perspective. The Equal Protection Clause of the 14
th
 Amendment was 
again central within the context of public education. Yet, this case was less about 
race and more about proper resource distribution, neighborhood wealth and quali-
ty schooling; in particular, whether or not the 14
th
 Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause requires states to provide equal funding for schools in rich and poor dis-
tricts, measured by property values? A Texas statute appropriated funds to provide 
each child with a minimum education and local school districts matched it with 
funds from locally levied “ad valorem” property taxes.12 “Because the value of 
                                                          
12 Ad valorem property taxes are those established in proportion to the value of the property to be 
taxed. 
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taxable property as well as the number of school-aged children differed greatly 
among the state’s more than one thousand districts, significant inter-district dis-
parities existed in available enhancement revenues, per-pupil expenditures, and 
tax rates” (Gambitta, 1992, p. 753). The Federal District Court held that the Texas 
law—or method used for funding schools—deprived plaintiffs (appellees) their 
right to equal protection under the Constitution. Accordingly, this lower federal 
court “ordered the state to finance its schools so that the amount spent on a child’s 
education did not depend upon the wealth of the neighborhood in which the child 
resided” (p. 754). 
In 1973, the Supreme Court by a contested 5 to 4 vote reversed the lower 
District Court’s decision that found the Texas school finance system unconstitu-
tional because: (1) wealth was seen as a “suspect” category within the judicial 
review classification scheme needing protection, (2) education was considered 
a fundamental right also needing protection, and (3) Texas failed to demonstrate 
a “compelling interest” to justify its school funding system. Supreme Court Justice 
Powell, for the majority, and after a lengthy technical discussion about equality in 
public schools, proclaimed that education was not a fundamental right because it 
was not guaranteed either explicitly or implicitly in the Constitution. Essentially 
the Court concluded that there is no constitutional right to an equal educational 
opportunity. Moreover, that “wealth [was] not a suspect classification, and [also] 
that the state’s system of funding public education was rational and constitutional” 
(O’Brien, 2003, p. 1532). What turned this case was that “Texas did not [...] de-
prive any class or anyone of an education, but rather assured [...] each child [...] 
receive a free minimum education” (Gamibitta, 1992, p. 754). Thus, instead of 
applying the strict scrutiny review test as the lower court had done, the Supreme 
Court applied the rational basis test (or minimal scrutiny) because the Texas 
school finance system did not disadvantage any Court recognized suspect classifi-
cation, for example, race. As such, the Court concluded that Texas’ method of 
public school finance did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14
th
 
Amendment since the state included local choices over tax rates, and a degree of 
educational enrichment that was seen as: (1) enhancing the state’s legitimate inter-
est in fostering local participation in public education, and (2) providing every 
child in the state with a free basic education (Gammon, 1977).   
However, the dissenting Justices argued that the Texas statute departed from 
the state’s purported objective of local control since property-poor school districts 
had no meaningful enhancement options available to them. Justice Brennan con-
tended that a fundamental right to education did in fact exist because of educa-
tion’s importance to the enjoyment of rights that are guaranteed in the Constitution 
(a notion similar to Chief Justice Warren’s ethical statement offered in Brown); 
and Justice Marshall followed that there ought to be a variable Equal Protection 
standard—one that assessed the characteristics of the class and the importance of 
the governmental benefits to that class—relative to the government’s interest in 
retaining the class classification. 
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With this outcome in mind, I explore several portions of the oral arguments in 
San Antonio dealing with the issue of equality, and fundamental rights and liberties. 
Mr. Charles A. Wright for the state of Texas and not School district, which ironical-
ly switched sides on appeal (Guitton & Irons, 1993, p. 323), argued that the Texas 
system of public school financing although not perfect “does allow for local variety, 
experimentation, and independence [and] that is its goal that is its rationale” (The 
Supreme Court of the United States, p. 572). Because of this reason, he further 
claimed, “the rational basis test is the appropriate test” to be applied (p. 572). Thus, 
Wright sought a reversal of the lower Federal District Court’s ruling by suggesting 
a different standard of judicial review be considered by the Court. A deliberation 
ensued regarding a proposed alternative system described as “district power equaliz-
ing” to which Wright was questioned whether he thought it would be appropriate to 
reach the constitutional standard of fundamental equality required: 
JUSTICE WHITE: So there would still be an equal import—there could be—into that?13  
MR. WRIGHT: There certainly could be. In fact a whole reason for having district 
power equalizing would be to make unequal input possible. 
JUSTICE WHITE: But under the Texas system it is impossible for some districts to 
have a sufficient input even if they are willing to tax themselves more. 
This brief exchange beginning with Justice White’s question provides, at 
minimum, an educative moment but for whom? The next exchange seems to sug-
gest an answer: 
MR. WRIGHT: To have a “sufficient input”? Was that your word, Justice White?   
JUSTICE WHITE: Yes. 
MR. WRIGHT: I would not agree with that, sir, no. Because our State Foundation 
program has assured to every district a sufficient input for an adequate education, 
and that it has left every district to decide for itself what, if anything, more— 
Justice White intervenes as in an educational seminar facilitating and control-
ling the discussion while attempting to get clarification on some key aspects of the 
broader argument about the power equalization alternative system. 
JUSTICE WHITE: So you think this is really power equalization you have now?   
MR. WRIGHT: No, I don’t think that ours is power equalization.  I think that ours 
is a matter of local choice. 
                                                          
13 This question refers to a comment made by Justice Wright that “if district power equalizing is 
a viable alternative that this case has ceased to be a case about education at all [...] this becomes a case 
for the relief of taxpayers, rather than a case to help out school children. Many of the writers who 
support drastic reform, and who support reform as a matter of constitutional judgment, have said that 
the district power of equalizing solution would itself be unconstitutional because it would make the 
number of dollars spent on a child dependent on what friends and neighbors think” (The Supreme 
Court of the United States, p. 573). 
82 CARLOS FIGUEROA  
The Court begins to shift the conversation to the constitutionality of the Tex-
as system more directly. Consequently, taking center stage is the notion of equal 
protection—as Justices Burger, Stewart, and Brennan intercede in the deliberative 
process. 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: Is there a question, however, that once the state under-
states to furnish education, then it must furnish a certain minimum adequate ed-
ucation for everybody? Once they start to go down that row they must follow 
through?   
Justice Burger clearly emphasizes the social injustice of inequality as a fun-
damental value to consider. 
MR. WRIGHT: We certainly must do it for everybody, yes.  If we are going to do 
it for any, then we must do it for every young person in the state. 
JUSTICE STEWART: Constitutionally as you know there are many, many decisions 
that say that county action is state action from the point of view of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 
MR. WRIGHT Yes, for some purposes, they are. But whether they are for purpos-
es of the equal protection clause in this kind of sense, there I would say our deci-
sions are to the contrary. They say that to have things different in one county 
than it is in another county is not a violation of the equal protection clause. 
JUSTICE BRENNAN: I am just curious. On district power equalizations, what about 
the percentage of ratings? Do they not differ in Texas? They seem to, every-
where else. Some places assess at 30 percent and some at 80 and some at 100. 
MR. WRIGHT: They differ very widely in Texas, as they do in most states, Justice 
Brennan. And I think that if a state were to adopt district power equalizing, it, as 
a practical matter, would have to adopt statewide assessing. I do not see any oth-
er way in which the scheme would be feasible. Otherwise you simply use a fa-
vorable rate and you get more than you are entitled to. And I think that demon-
strates the further incursion on local government that the ideas presented here by 
the appellees represent that very little is to be left of local government if the de-
cision below is affirmed. 
We contend [thus] that if we are subject only to the rational basis test, that 
this is not one of those cases in which we must demonstrate a compelling 
state interest in order to justify the results for which we argue and justify 
the state plan. 
Later the Court moves on to deliberating with Mr. Gochman who is repre-
senting the public school children (appellees). Justice Rehnquist engages Goch-
man with a direct question attempting to explore the consequences of a power 
equalization system. With this type of intervention, Justice Rehnquist seemed 
compelled to teach a short lesson about the irony of such an alternative system in 
public education. 
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JUSTICE REHNQUIST: [Mr. Gochman] you say if you went to power equalization 
Edgewood would have the opportunity to get itself out of the situation? If it 
chose not to get out of it—the State—it would not be free to make that choice? 
Did you not just say to me that it would still, if it chose not to, the choice would 
itself be a violation of equal protection? Did you say that? 
With these questions the Court sought clarification while providing a lesson 
on consistency and fairness before proceeding to the question of which standard 
of review (Kunsch, 1994) then is required in the case. Freedom of choice is sug-
gested as a fundamental right.  
MR. GOCHMAN: No. If the compelling interest of local control is that strong, they 
you could have that kind of discrimination; that the people in an area can decide 
for themselves whether they want to lock themselves into a poor school system. 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST: What is your position on that question about the compelling 
interest? I mean that is really the question. Would it be constitutional, or would 
it not, for Edgewood to have the opportunity but chooses not to exercise it? 
MR. GOCHMAN: I would think it would be constitutional. 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST: In effect, your theory makes the districts equal, but may 
leave the students utterly unequal? 
Justice Rehnquist’s point implicitly raises the issue of race (as in the Brown 
case) because of the composition of the poor school district in Edgewood (96% 
racial minorities), which the Court later dismisses as not relevant to reaching their 
decision, however. 
MR. GOCHMAN: Yes. But it would have a different basis, at least. It would not 
lock onto the poor as it does now.  And, mobility is a serious factor in this case. 
If this were a rich guy in a poor district, we would not be in court. He would just 
move. But the poor had no way out of the present system. 
This deliberative engagement with the Justices at the head of the national 
seminar in oral argument seemed rooted in a concern for broader understanding of 
social meanings. Yet, the Court focused more on sustaining the “will” of the peo-
ple by making sure to reveal the significance of equality as a fundamental value 
but from a more conservative pro-local collective choice perspective. 
8. Conclusion 
After exploring the U.S. Supreme Court’s educative role historically, theoretically 
and textually, and especially in light of current debates about who should be ap-
pointed by President Donald Trump, at least two points should be considered: 
First, the Supreme Court has a constitutional obligation through its power of  
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judicial review and as a “co-equal” institution to contribute substantively to the 
larger policy debates within an American democratic environment characterized in 
deliberative and pluralist terms. Second, the Court’s lesser known educative role 
should be accepted during oral arguments when internal deliberation matters prior 
to the Court’s public pronouncements on policy controversies. 
To this extent, three assumptions need to be made explicit—one empirical 
and the last two normative: (1) the U.S. democratic order is underwritten 
by a constitutional system guided by a written Constitution, which itself provides 
a warrant for the various institutional roles of the Supreme Court, (2) political 
actors, citizens, and scholars should take the Court’s adjudicating processes, espe-
cially during oral arguments, seriously to the extent that managing, maintaining, 
and controlling a large multifaceted society within a complex constitutional or-
der actually matters, and (3) that those personally involved in litigation, in legislat-
ing along with resolving constitutional disputes and broader social and political 
disagreements, should appreciate the importance of equality, fairness and ethics as 
fundamental values worth pursuing and protecting for sustaining democratic life. 
Yet, scholars have long argued that the Court has been an anti-democratic in-
stitution because of its counter-majoritarian nature. However, I showed in this 
article that moving the debate away from considering the Court’s place within 
majoritarian system to instead a pluralist deliberative one makes room for a ‘co-
equal’ institutional partner; thus allowing Justices to use judicial review as an 
instrument for carrying out important broader constitutional functions, including 
an educative role. To this end, I tried to move beyond traditional theoretical and 
normative debates about judicial review’s place in U.S. politics. Instead, I ex-
plored the “national seminar” metaphor differently and focused on the Court’s 
work during oral arguments in two separate cases that invoked the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the 14
th
 Amendment, and less on the impact of final decisions on 
social norms and liberal democratic life. 
Finally, since at least the mid-twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
instructed and guided in order to protect the dignity and integrity of individual 
citizens through its concerns for civil rights and liberties, with various exceptions. 
In this article, I found that in order to justify an institutional egalitarian argument, 
we have to consider different modes of interpretation, or the methods of textual 
interpretation used by each justice to determine the meaning of their reason-based 
questions (ethical or otherwise) during oral argument. This has to be considered in 
order to assess whether or not the Court does possess a consistent educative func-
tion prior to any legal pronouncements. Last, this study reveals that there are occa-
sions when the Court’s educative role—with the “question” as a teaching device 
guiding deliberations—becomes necessary to not only maintaining ethical stand-
ards during oral arguments but also sustaining a broader vital pluralist democratic 
system.   
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